Strain Theory by Robert Merton | An Analysis

Strain Theory by Robert Merton | An Analysis In criminology, the strain theory describes social structures inside society that may support people to carry out crime. Following the work of Emile Durkheim, Strain Theories have been supported by Robert King Merton, Albert K. Cohen, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, Robert Agnew, and Steven Messner and Richard Rosenfeld. Strain may be either: Structural: this applies to the procedures at the community level which break down and impact how one judges their requirements, i.e. if specific social controls are insufficient or there is little regulation, this may alter the individuals outlook as to methods and prospects; or Individual: This term represents the hostility and barriers faced by persons as they look for ways to fulfill their needs or desires, i.e. if the norms of a society become important to a person, in fact accomplishing them may become more significant than the methods. The History of Strain Theory Strain theory was created from the work of Durkheim and Merton and derived from the theory of anomie. Durkheim concentrated on the reduction of societal control and the strain that was caused at the individual level, and Merton analyzed the cultural connection that is present between the individual and the standards of society. Anomie can be split into two separate levels. The first of these levels is the macro side of anomie, which is apparent in the capacity of society to establish restrictions on societal norms and goals, and ultimately control an individuals conduct. The micro side of anomie, also called as strain theory, is focused on the motives underlying the bigger probability of deviance that accumulates from the breakdown of society. In accordance with this micro side of anomie, the reduction in societal controls generates more desire to perform deviant actions (Agnew Passas, 1997:2-3). Agnew and Passas (1997) dealt with the similarities between the macro level of anomie and control theory; however, they claimed that the micro level theory of strain should be judged in a distinct way different from the control theory. Agnew (1992:48) also contrasted and compared strain theory to control theory and social learning theory. The theories vary in the kind of social relationships that they emphasize and the motivations on which they are established. The control theory hinges on the notion that the breakdown of society frees the individual to carry out crime; strain theory is motivated on the strain that is put on the person to carry out crime (Agnew, 1992). Social learning theory is founded on the fundamentals from a group that bring about a constructive or positive view of crime (Agnew, 1992). In accordance with strain theory, individual deviance is created due to negative treatment from others, and this causes anger and disappointment (Agnew, 1997a). Control theory, tho ugh, is founded on the lack of significant relationships with non-deviant others, i.e. family, church, and social learning theory is based on positive interactions with other that are considered deviant. (Agnew, 1992). The attractiveness of strain/anomie theory began in the late 1960s owing to the need of data presented by analysts and the political and social environment of the decade (Agnew Passas, 1997). The lack of supporting evidence can be due to many deficiencies in the original methods used by the analysts (Agnew Passas, 1997). Generalization of the theory and an ignorance of the earlier revisions caused a body of work that distorted the original definition of anomie/strain theory (Agnew Passas, 1997). Together with these deficiencies, modern theorists have claimed that empirical evidence in fact supports the theory (Agnew, Cullen, Burton, Evans, Gregory 1996). Mertons Strain Theory: Economic Goals, Educational Means Delinquency In the history of modern criminology, few theories have realized the impact of Mertons (1983) theory of strain and deviance. It has withstood a half-century despite a sizeable amount of literature opposed to its theoretical basis. Disillusionment with its empirical verification, on the other hand, has caused many to discard it as a possible explanation for delinquency (Hirschi, 1969; Johnson, 1979; Kornhauser, 1978). In view of the fact that the strain theory incorporates both mental and structural account for crime, its dismissal would be a critical loss to criminology. Together with reservations about the significance of social class in the birth of crime, the denial of Mertons theory of structurally induced strain could create a typical shift toward theories of individual behavior lacking structural context. The historical significance and unique contribution of strain theory deserves a re-examination before its final rejection. Mertons original explanation of strain was criticized for its theoretical uncertainty (Cohen, 1955; Lindesmith Gagnon, 1964). For instance, Merton gave examples of deviance perhaps linked with different methods of adjustment although he did not offer any statements regarding the methods by which each adaptive method might impact various crime results (Clinard, 1964a). The consequences of this type of vagueness are apparent in trials for the research of strain impacts on juvenile delinquency. The theory appears to mean that innovation causes utilitarian kinds of delinquency although does not state whether strain clarifies common kinds of juvenile crime for example sabotage or personal crimes of a non-utilitarian character (Gibbons Jones, 1975; Thio, 1975). The theory is implied as to whether strain should foresee crime prevalence or frequency or both, or critical against non-critical types. Akers operationalization of Agnews theory: Sources of strain Akers (2000) has operationalized Agnews version of the Strain Theory, as follows: Failure to achieve positively valued goals: the gap between expectations and actual achievements will derive from short- and long-term personal goals, and some of those goals will never be realized because of unavoidable circumstances including both inherent weaknesses and opportunities blocked by others; and the difference between the view of what a person believes the outcome should be and what actually results increases personal disappointment. Frustration is not necessarily due to any outside interference with valued goals, but a direct effect on anger, and has indirect effects on serious crime and aggression. Agnew and White (1992) have produced empirical evidence suggesting that general strain theory was positively able to relate delinquents and drug users, and that the strongest effect on the delinquents studied was the delinquency of their peers. They were interested in drug use because it did not appear to represent an attempt to direct anger or escape pain, but is used prim arily to manage the negative affect caused by strain. Up to this stage, strain theory had been related with types of strain as opposed to sources of strain while the stress of ones surroundings can be shown to involve with the expectations of just and fair results. These may be major events or minor hassles that build up and discourage over time. Frustration causes disappointment, bitterness, and anger all the emotions normally linked with strain in criminology. It is normal for persons to feel pain when they are refused fair compensations for their efforts, especially when measured against the endeavors and compensations given to others for similar results. Agnew (1992) deals with anger as the most decisive emotion as it is almost always aimed outwards and is generally linked to breakdowns in relationships. Study shows that the stress/crime relationship seems to hold regardless of guilt emotions, age, and capacity to deal with when events take place simultaneously or in close sequence. Robert Agnew In 1992, Agnew maintained that strain theory could be fundamental in describing crime and deviance, however that it required review so that it was not attached to social class or cultural standards; however, re-focused on self standards. He mapped out a general strain theory that is neither structural nor interpersonal; however, emotional and motivated on an individuals direct social status. He claimed that an individuals concrete or anticipated failure to realize positively valued objectives, actual or expected removal of positive values, and actual or anticipated presentation of negative motivation all results in strain. Strain appears from negative relationships with others. If persons are not dealt in the way that they anticipate or want to be dealt, they will lose their trust in the role others play for achieving goals. Anger and disappointment support unconstructive relationships. This will generally involve more one-sided action since there will be an innate wish to avoid unwanted rejections, supporting more general isolation. If specific rejections are general feelings that the situation is unjust or unfair, stronger and more negative feelings may inspire the person to engage in crime. This is especially true for younger people, and Agnew proposed that study concentrate on the overall , currency, duration, and grouping of such stressful events to find out whether a person deal with strain in a criminal or compliant way. He especially found temperament, intelligence, factors interpersonal skills, relationship with criminal peers and conservative social support important factors of self-efficacy. Robert Dubin Dubin (1959) judged deviance as a task of society, disputing the hypothesis that the deviant action resulting from circumstances of anomie is essentially damaging to society. For instance, a person in the ritualistic environment is still playing by the regulations and contributing to society. The only deviance lies in discarding one or more of its prescribed objectives. Dubin maintained that Mertons concentration on the interactions between societys stressed objectives, and institutionalized agreed methods was insufficient. Dubin thought an added difference should be made between cultural objectives, organizational methods and organizational standards since individuals identify standards individually, explaining them and operating them in a different way. The individual educational skills, principles, and behaviors may influence a person to internalize a norm one way. Another individual with different experiences may justifiably internalize in a different way. Both may be doing realistically in their own terms; however, the behavior is different. Dubin also expanded Mertons classification to fourteen, with particular focus in Innovation and Ritualism. Merton put forward that the new response to strain was linking the objective, although discarding the organizing agreed methods of realizing the objective. The connotation appeared to be that not only did the person discard the methods, he must vigorously innovate unlawful methods as a replacement which would not always be correct. Dubin also believed that a difference should be made between the real behavior of the individual and the principles that pushed the behavior. Rather than Innovation, Dubin put forward Behavioral Innovation and Value Innovation. Likewise, in Ritualism, he put forward Behavioral Ritualism and Value Ritualism (Dubin, 1959). Merton (1959) remarked on Dubins changes, claiming that although Dubin did make suitable contributions, they took the motivations off of deviancy. Operationalizing Strain for Juveniles Merton termed strain as an individuals response to a dysfunction between objectives and accessibility to the socially accepted methods for their achievement. Mertons original writings (1938; 1957) appear to spell out clearly that economic wealth is a principal goal in the meritocratic society and that education is the conservative ways for realizing wealth. At present, for instance, a college degree is usually considered as a minimum requirement for entry to a good job or professional job. Strain would be possible when a person is firmly dedicated to making much wealth nevertheless considers college as outside attainment. It is thought that structurally induced strain amongst juveniles would be considered correctly as the dysfunction between economic objectives and hopes for finishing college. On the contrary, the preferential operationalization of strain in delinquency researches has been the difference between educational aims and hopes. The argument for using this evaluation is that job expectations are less helpful as objectives for juveniles since these expectations are too far removed from their conscious concerns (Agnew, 1986, 1984; Elliott, Huizinga, Ageton, 1985). This normally used measure deviates considerably from Mertons theory. If strain is redefined completely in the field of education, the educational methods in Mertons original theory become both objectives and methods, and the central theoretical significance of economic objectives is lost. The basis for this version of strain for juveniles is challenging. Although juveniles may have trouble in thinking about future jobs, their financial aspirations may be strong and clear. For both hypothetical and rational motives, as a result, juvenile strain is a product of the dysfunction between economic objectives and educational prospects rather than as a dysfunction between educational aims and prospects. Conclusion In 1969, Hirschi proposed within a control outlook that high expectations to customary objectives performed as limitations on delinquency (1969) and that the calculation of a measure of strain would not enhance the descriptive competence of dedication alone. As against the strain position that high expectations in the presence of low expectations raise the chances of delinquency, Hirschi (1969) presumed that the (negative) relation between aspirations and delinquency (supportive of control theory) does not reverse when expectations are held constant. His assessment using educational expectations showed that while higher goals reduced the chance of delinquency in his sample, differences in educational expectations are not significant in the causation of delinquency for two reasons: few boys in the sample have expectations considerably beyond their expectations; and those boys whose expectations far exceed their expectations are at no greater risk to be delinquent than those boys whose expectations are the same (1969). More researches by Liska (1971) with several data sets strengthened Hirschis result. Similar to Hirschi, Liska computed juvenile strain as the dysfunction between educational expectations and reported results showing that Mertons stress proposition might be interpreted more simply by dedication or control theory. Therefore the most overwhelming criticism of strain theory relates to its noticeable failure in empirical research, mainly its failure in relation to control theory (Johnson, 1979; Kornhauser, 1978). In contrast, the majority of the studies supporting such results ignored the importance of economic success objectives in creating strain (Bernard, 1984). Hirschi recognized the possible value of income expectations in testing control and strain proposals (1969). His and Liskas denial of strain theory, though, depended on the assessment of objectives and methods as educational expectations Is EC Law Compatible with Parliamentary Sovereignty? Is EC Law Compatible with Parliamentary Sovereignty? Is the primacy of EC law over inconsistent UK statutes compatible with the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty? The notion of Parliament as the supreme law-making body in the UK is a long-standing shibboleth of the British constitution[1]. Acts of Parliament have traditionally been deemed to be the highest form of law in the UK, and the courts were denied the authority to challenge them[2]. In 1972, however, the signing of the Treaty of Rome brought the UK within the scope of EC law[3]. The European Court of Justice has emphasised the primacy of EC law over the national law of its member states[4] and national courts are expected to recognise this. The British courts’ apparent capitulation[5] might suggest that Parliamentary sovereignty has now been usurped by the primacy of EC law. If true, this would be a major upheaval in our constitutional framework. However, on a closer analysis it seems that accession to the EC has had a less revolutionary effect on the British constitution than was initially feared. This paper will consider the relationship between these two seemingly irreconcilable doctrines and examine the question of whether they are capable of co-existence. Parliamentary Sovereignty Parliamentary sovereignty has a lengthy history in British constitutional law[6]. The definitive analysis was provided by Albert Dicey in the late 19th Century in his text Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution[7]. Essentially, the principle provides that Parliament is the highest law-making authority in the UK. It â€Å"has the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.†[8] Dicey expands on this assertion to emphasise that Parliament was competent to pass laws on any subject[9]. The only thing that it could not do is bind its successors[10]. Furthermore, the courts lack the authority to challenge any statute that has been enacted using the correct procedure[11]. Primacy of EC Law Britain acceded to the European Communities in 1973, with the signing of the Treaty of Rome. EC law was given effect in Britain through the enactment of the European Communities Act 1972, which gave direct effect and application to EC law[12]. Article 10 of the Treaty of Rome, as amended, states that there is a duty on all member states to comply with Community law and not to impede its application and the European Court of Justice has vociferously emphasised its expectation that EC law will prevail where it conflicts with the domestic law of member states[13]. In Costa, for example, the ECJ states that â€Å"the precedence of Community law is confirmed by Art 189 (now 249) EC, whereby a regulation â€Å"shall be binding† and directly applicable in all Member States†[14]. In other words, EC law takes primacy over domestic law. The British courts have since demonstrated their willingness to comply with this instruction[15]. In Factortame No. 2[16], for example, Lord Bridge stated that â€Å"under the 1972 Act, it has always been clear that it was the duty of a UK court when delivering final judgment to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable Community law.†[17] Conflict between the doctrines The potential for conflict here is self-evident. The courts cannot serve two masters but, as long as these two competing doctrines co-exist, this effectively appears to be what they are being asked to do. On the one hand, Parliamentary sovereignty dictates that the courts have no right to question an Act of Parliament. On the other, EC law, which declares itself to be supreme, expects national courts to declare Acts of Parliament invalid to the extent that they are inconsistent with EC Law. On a practical level, it appears that the primacy of EC law has overwhelmed Parliamentary Sovereignty. The UK courts have grown more comfortable with applying EC law where it conflicts with UK statutes and EC law has become an accepted part of the British legal system. As Munro points out, however, it is important to remember that Parliamentary sovereignty is a legal doctrine[18]. It is not concerned with the political or practical effects of accession upon the authority of Parliament, but with whether, legally speaking, parliamentary sovereignty is preserved[19]. This is an important consideration. In cases that followed the enactment of the 1972 Act, Lord Denning attempted to reconcile the apparently conflicting norms[20]. He argued that, although EC law was treated by the courts as prevailing over conflicting domestic law, EC law was only offered this status on the basis of an Act of Parliament, the 1972 Act. As the 1972 Act has no greater status than any other parliamentary statute, it could be repealed by an express provision in a subsequent Act of Parliament. The legal concept of Parliamentary sovereignty is therefore preserved.[21] The 1972 is not presented as being in any way superior to a normal Act of Parliament[22]. Indeed, during the ministerial discussions that preceded the passing of the Act it was acknowledged that any attempt to do so could readily be overturned by a subsequent Parliament[23]. Of course, the doctrine of implied repeal cannot operate in respect of the 1972 Act since it is not considered to be overridden by subsequent contradictory enactments. As Munro points out, however, this is a characteristic shared by other legislation and does not necessarily threaten the sovereignty of Parliament[24]. Ward believes that parliamentary sovereignty is an archaic legal fiction that ignores political realities and serves no purpose in a modern setting shaped by the twin influences of globalisation and decentralisation of power[25]. He considers that we would be best served by abandoning the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty in favour of a â€Å"new constitutional order†[26]. However, even he acknowledges that, on the legal plane at least, the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty undoubtedly continues to exist alongside EC law[27]. Conclusion As Munro has argued, is important to distinguish the legal concept of Parliamentary sovereignty from a political or pragmatic interpretation of the term. While it may be that repeal of the 1972 Act and withdrawal from the EC would be impossible in real terms, Parliament retains the legal option to do this. Therefore, it is theoretically possible to reconcile the apparently conflicting doctrines within our constitutional framework. BIBLIOGRAPHY Barnett, H.A. Constitutional and Administrative Law (Cavendish: London) 2004 Bradley, A. â€Å"The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?† in Jowell, J. and Oliver, D. The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press: Oxford) 2004 Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan Education: Basingstoke) 1959 Goldsworthy, J.D. The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford University Press: Oxford) 1999 Munro, C. Studies in Constitutional Law (Butterworths: London) 1999 Ward, I. A Critical Introduction to European Law (Butterworths: London) 1996 Ward, I. The Margins of European Law (Macmillan Education: Basingstoke) 1996 Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] C.M.L.R. 105 Costa v. Ente Nazionale per lEnergia Elettrica (ENEL) [1968] C.M.L.R. 267 McCarthys Ltd v Smith (1979) 3 All ER 325 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p. Factortame Ltd (No. 2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603 (HL) 1 Footnotes [1] See generally Goldsworthy, J.D. The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford University Press: Oxford) 1999 [2] Bradley, A. â€Å"The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?† in Jowell, J. and Oliver, D. The Changing Constitution (Oxford University Press: Oxford) 2004 (hereinafter â€Å"Bradley†) at 28 [3] Barnett, H.A. Constitutional and Administrative Law (Cavendish: London) 2004 (hereinafter â€Å"Barnett†) at 192 [4]Ibid [5] Bradley supra note 2 at 46 [6] See e.g. Munro, C. Studies in Constitutional Law (Butterworths: London) 1999 (hereinafter â€Å"Munro†) at 127 [7] Dicey, A.V. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan Education: Basingstoke) 1959 (hereinafter â€Å"Dicey†) [8] Dicey supra note 7 at 39 [9] Ibid [10] Dicey supra note 7 at 44 [11] Dicey supra note 7 at 45 [12] Munro supra note 6 at 201 [13] See e.g. Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] C.M.L.R. 105 (hereinafter â€Å"Van Gend en Loos†) and Costa v. Ente Nazionale per lEnergia Elettrica (ENEL) [1968] C.M.L.R. 267 (hereinafter â€Å"Costa†) [14] Costa supra note 13 at 271 [15] Bradley supra note 2 at 46 [16] R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p. Factortame Ltd (No. 2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603 (HL) (hereinafter â€Å"Factortame†) [17] Factortame supra note 16 at 659 [18] Munro supra note 6 at 206 [19] Ibid [20] Ward, I. The Margins of European Law (Macmillan Education: Basingstoke) 1996 (hereinafter â€Å"Margins†) at 76 [21] See e.g. McCarthys Ltd v Smith (1979) 3 All ER 325 [22] Munro supra note 6 at 204 [23] Bradley supra note 2 at 47 [24] Munro supra note 6 at 207 [25] Margins supra note 7 at Chapter 4 [26] Margins supra note 7 at 82 [27] Margins supra note 7 at 85